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Abstract. Deep learning model developers often use cloud GPU re-
sources to experiment with large data and models that need expensive
setups. However, this practice raises privacy concerns. Adversaries may
be interested in: 1) personally identifiable information or objects encoded
in the training images, and 2) the models trained with sensitive data to
launch model-based attacks. Learning deep neural networks (DNN) from
encrypted data is still impractical due to the large training data and
the expensive learning process. A few recent studies have tried to pro-
vide efficient, practical solutions to protect data privacy in outsourced
deep-learning. However, we find out that they are vulnerable under cer-
tain attacks. In this paper, we specifically identify two types of unique
attacks on outsourced deep-learning: 1) the visual re-identification at-
tack on the training data, and 2) the class membership attack on the
learned models, which can break existing privacy-preserving solutions.
We develop an image disguising approach to address these attacks and
design a suite of methods to evaluate the levels of attack resilience for
a privacy-preserving solution for outsourced deep learning. The experi-
mental results show that our image-disguising mechanisms can provide
a high level of protection against the two attacks while still generating
high-quality DNN models for image classification.
1 Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNN) generate robust modeling results across diverse
domains such as image classification, natural language processing, speech recog-
nition, and recommendation systems [1]. However, DNN training is resource in-
tensive and time-consuming. Model developers often utilize cloud GPU resources
to train large-scale models. A major concern is the privacy of the sensitive data
and the trained models that may be stolen, traded, or possibly used to explore
the private training data.
One possible approach to addressing the privacy issue in outsourcing DNN is
by training the models over encrypted data. However, due to the large training
data and expensive training process, cryptographic approaches are too expensive
to be practical as shown in a recent study on training small scale neural networks
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[12]. As a result, cryptographic approaches are practically limited to testing
DNNs as in CryptoNets [18], which is much more simpler and less expensive
than training a DNN model.
Differential Privacy (DP) has been applied for deep learning in a different
setting [15,2], where sharing, not hiding, the training data and model is the
goal. Abadi et al. [2] consider the problem of building DNN models that do not
leak to the model consumers the private information specific to any individual
training examples. Shokri et al. [15] study a similar problem where data con-
tributors are distributed. These methods cannot be adapted to the outsourced
training scenario where privacy of both data and model is of concern. Further-
more, DP mechanisms result in a significant tradeoff between utility and privacy.
For example, with a practical privacy setting, such as  = 2, Abadi et al. [2]
report over 15− 20% accuracy reduction in classifying the MNIST dataset.
A few recent studies try to address the confidentiality problem with the
training data. Fan et al. [4] apply differential privacy in hiding pixel-level details
in the sensitive images. However, it does not protect sensitive contents that
involve the entire images. In a different work, Li et al. [9] propose hiding private
data by submitting locally learned shallower neural networks to the cloud for
further learning. However, the results show that the content of the intermediate
representations is visually identifiable. These studies generally fail in protecting
from the simplest attack — manual visual content inspection by an attacker.
In summary, existing privacy-preserving techniques for deep learning are ei-
ther too expensive, not designed for the outsourced setting, or vulnerable to the
simple visual attacks.
Scope and contributions.
In this work, we thoroughly study the problems with existing candidate ap-
proaches for privacy-preserving outsourced deep learning and propose two novel
attacks that a viable solution should address. Our work is focused on image train-
ing data and classification tasks. (1) The first attack is the visual re-identification
attack, where an attacker can visually identify the major content of a protected
image. Due to the recent studies [8] that shows DNN models have outperformed
human experts in image recognition tasks, the attack can be further carried out
automatically with a trained “DNN examiner” model that tries to recognize the
contents from protected images. (2) The second attack is the class-membership
attack. In this attack, an adversary is able to use the model and access the model
output, however, does not know the secret parameter settings of the data pro-
tection mechanism. The attack goal is to determine whether a class of images
was included in the training data. Specifically, for classification tasks, this attack
can be carried out by observing the distribution characteristics of the predicted
labels for a set of images from the same class, e.g., different face images of the
same person in face recognition. For a reasonably performing image classifier,
the test images if similar to a class in the training data will have distinct output
distributions, i.e., most labels will be of the same class, which is untrue if the
test images are dissimilar from any of the training data classes. Most methods
that expose the learned models or their outputs are vulnerable to this attack.
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To address these two attacks in the outsourced setting, we present a novel
image disguising mechanism that protects both the training data and the learned
models. The intuition is that with appropriately transformed images, the pow-
erful deep learning techniques can still pick up the unique topological/geometric
features preserved in the transformed spaces to effectively distinguish the classes
of the transformed images. Our image disguising mechanism combines block-wise
permutation and multidimensional transformation to achieve excellent levels of
visual privacy, an empirical measure designed to evaluate the effectiveness of
visual re-identification attack, and strong resilience to the model-based class-
membership attack. We summarize our contributions as follows:
1. We identify two attacks that a viable privacy-preserving solution should con-
sider in outsourced deep learning: the visual re-identification attack and the
class-membership attack. We also propose empirical methods for evaluating
the effectiveness of such attacks.
2. We design a suite of image disguising mechanisms for image-based DNN
learning in the outsourced setting that thwarts both the visual re-identification
and the class-membership attacks while preserving information in the trans-
formed space for deriving high-quality models.
3. We conduct extensive experimental evaluations on several public datasets
to show the trade-offs of related parameter settings for the image disguising
mechanisms and their resilience to the identified attacks.
Next, we briefly outline this paper. Section 2 describes DNN outsourcing,
the potential privacy threats, and shortcomings of some existing techniques that
target the privacy issue. Then, it introduces the visual re-identification and class-
membership attacks and describes the security assumptions for our work. In
Section 3, we introduce a suite of image disguising mechanisms that enable
privacy-preserving deep learning in the outsourced setting. Section 4 analyzes
the security of the proposed mechanisms. Section 5 presents the results for the
experimental evaluations of our privacy mechanisms in terms of model quality,
resiliency against the two attacks, and related trade-offs. We refer to the most
relevant related works in Section 6 and finally conclude the paper in Section 7.
2 Attacks on Outsourced Deep Learning
In this section, we describe the setting of outsourced deep learning and define
two types of attacks that a viable privacy-preserving solution has to address.
General Framework. DNN learning is resource and time intensive for mas-
sive data and larger and intricate architectures such as ResNet [7]. Resource-
constrained data owners outsource their data to public cloud providers such as
AWS’s elastic GPUs to benefit from their high-performance GPU computation
resources. Figure 1 shows the general framework for outsourced deep learning:
the data owner offloads her training data to the cloud provider and deploys the
cloud provider’s GPU resources in training complex DNN models. After train-
ing, the data owner can either download the learned model for local use or just
upload newer testing data to the cloud for prediction.
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Fig. 1. A data owner outsources her images to a cloud provider for storage and DNN
modeling using GPU clusters.
Outsourcing DNN learning to the cloud provider introduces privacy risks
when the training images may include sensitive images, as cloud providers are
not fully trustable. An adversarial party may investigate the uploaded images
manually with human visual inspection to identify and analyze characteristics
of sensitive objects. Furthermore, the adversary may exploit the learned models
for its own use or launching model-based attacks as we will describe. Therefore,
the data owner must either completely trust the cloud provider or deploy some
data and model privacy protection mechanisms.
Problems with Existing Privacy-Preserving Approaches. Due to the
inherent cost of crypto approaches, they are not ideal candidates in hiding im-
ages from adversaries in outsourced deep learning as shown by [12,18]. A few
efficient data protection methods have been proposed recently to address the
cost issue. Fan et al. [4] rely on a differentially private (DP) mechanism to hide
certain sensitive pixels (e.g., a person’s face or a license plate number) in the
larger-context images. However, it depends on the predefined size of the sensitive
objects in the images to determine the noise and  privacy levels. This is difficult
to apply in practice because of numerous possible variations of shapes, sizes,
distances, and angles a sensitive object may be projected in different images.
Often, many training data contains large size objects, such as human faces, that
can be sensitive. Even for images containing many objects, as shown in Figure 2
(a), it is difficult to identify which sizes of an object are appropriate to protect.
Furthermore, it is unclear whether blurring the targets is sufficient - the overall
context may also reveal private information.
In a different work, Li et al. [9] propose learning the first few layers of the
target DNN model locally and outsourcing the intermediate representation to
the cloud provider for further learning. Unfortunately, the intermediate represen-
tation when reconstructed at the cloud provider’s sites is visually recognizable
despite high Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR) (a metric used to quantify vi-
sual privacy in the paper) as seen in Figure 2 (b).
original DP ε = 0.5 original 15.8 dB 16.9 dB
(a) (b)
Fig. 2. (a) DP-based pixellation of images [4] reveals the global properties of the
images making them distinguishable. (b) The reconstructed images in PrivyNet [9]
resemble the original images despite high PSNR values.
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In summary, there is no practical method for protecting the confidentiality
of training data yet in outsourced deep learning. The cryptographic methods are
still too expensive, and the two recent methods that avoid encryption [9,4] do
not protect the images from visual inspection.
2.1 Adversarial Model and Attacks
In the general framework we described earlier, we consider the adversaries can
compromise the cloud infrastructure thus see the training data and the learned
model if no protection mechanism is applied. In addition, we assume that adver-
saries can use the model as a black box - feeding the model with testing images
and getting the prediction labels - even if the training data and the model is
protected with some mechanism while the output labels are revealed. We will
present two attacks specific to outsourced image-based deep learning: 1) Visual
re-identification attack aimed at compromising the visual privacy of protected
images, and 2) the class-membership attack aimed at exploiting a trained model
in determining if a certain class of images was included in the training dataset.
Then, we will elaborate on the security assumptions we will base our work on.
Visual Re-identification Attack. We have shown that the existing work
[9,4] are not effective at all in hiding sensitive images. An attacker can simply
browse the blurred images to find out sensitive information. Before we propose
our own mechanism for image-based deep learning (Section 3), we explore the
basic requirement for protecting the privacy of image data: no adversary should
be able to visually identify sensitive objects from the protected image data.
We name this characteristic visual privacy. We found that none of the existing
metrics can precisely capture or define visual privacy. Use of pixel-level mean
square error by Fan et al. [4] and peak signal-noise ratio by Li et al. [9] do not
capture the semantic understanding level that humans’ visual perception can.
We propose a DNN-based visual re-identification “examiner” to serve as the
agent of a human attacker. The recent advances in high-accuracy DNN models
[8] have shown that DNN models have exceeded human experts in image classi-
fication. Inspired by this, we propose to use a DNN models to impersonate the
visual attackers to scan the protected images. We call such DNN models the
“DNN examiners”. Specifically, we can train a DNN examiner on the original
training data and deploy it to distinguish the protected images. A high-accuracy
result of the re-identification attack suggests the protection mechanism under
scrutiny fails to maintain visual privacy. We define then visual privacy as (1-
Accuracy of DNN examiner in classifying the protected images).
Class-membership Attack. Given a protection mechanism that thwarts the
visual re-identification attack successfully, we need to eliminate any potential
abuse of the exposed model trained on the protected images in exploring the
training images. After carefully examining the outsourced deep learning scenar-
ios, we identify a new class-membership attack that has not been defined or
explored by the related work [4,9] yet.
In the following, we design an attack that enables adversaries to learn whether
a certain class of images was used as training examples by observing the target
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model’s outputs. Figure 3 shows the basic setting that adversaries can use (and
thus explore) to try the model with any testing data in their hand and observe the
model’s outputs. The intuition is that a well-trained model should work nicely
on records similar to the ones belonging to the training data classes whereas
poorly on images from unrelated categories. For example, a face recognition
DNN trained on 10 persons’ face images must work much better on test images
belonging to the same 10 individuals on test images belonging to others. Let us
denote the two categories of image classes as “in-training” and “out-training”
classes respectively.
We can define this attack formally. Given a fully trained DNN model and
known output labels {ci|ci ∈ C}, the adversary prepares a set of images, {ti, i =
1..m}, belonging to some class c (a target class) that may or may not be one of the
output labels. The adversary launches the class-membership attack to determine
if c ∈ C, i.e. if the training dataset included images belonging to the target class
c. The attacker’s strategy is to characterize the output distribution Pr(c′|{ti})
that will aid in inferring class memberships, where c′ represents the models
prediction outputs. Test images belonging to an in-training class are consistently
classified by the model to the same class with high probability for a reasonably
good model; whereas test images belonging to an out-training class may see more
uncertain outputs. Figure 3 illustrates the idea of class-membership attack. A
pointy histogram infers the target class (or a closely related class) was likely
included in the training set whereas a flatter histogram suggests the target class
was not likely included in the training set. Such distribution differences can
be captured with entropy or Fano factor. Fano factor, similar to the variance-
to-mean ratio (VMR), measures the index of dispersion and can be used in
determining how two sets of observed occurrences are clustered or dispersed.
Correspondingly, in-training examples of the same class will show smaller entropy
or higher Fano factor than out-training examples. In experiments, we have shown
that unprotected models are extremely vulnerable to class-membershup attack.
{ti |ci ∈ C} 
DNN Model
{ti |ci ∉ C} Test ObservePr(c’ | ti)
Fig. 3. Class-membership Attack. Given a DNN model, an attacker analyzes the pre-
diction outcomes of a series of testing images to determine if a certain class of images
were included in the training set.
Expanding on the class-membership attack, an attacker may determine if a
certain dataset was likely the training data, partially or fully.
Any deep learning framework that exposes the model for sharing are subject
to this attack. For example, the differentially private models trained with the
techniques of Abadi et al. [2] and Shokri et al. [15] are subject to the class-
membership attack unless the model quality is low enough (due to the privacy
setting), in which case the output distribution of in-training examples cannot
6
be statistically distinguished from that of out-training examples. This, however,
would fall short of the goal of developing useful models.
Security Assumptions. Here, we will make some relevant security assump-
tions we will base our disguising mechanisms for image-based deep learning on:
1) We consider ciphertext-only attacks, i.e., any disguised image and its original
image pair is unknown to the adversary; 2) The adversary possesses no prior
knowledge of the images being outsourced, but they can use any images to ex-
plore the trained model; 3) All infrastructures and communication channels must
be secure. We consider an honest-but-curious adversary, who may be interested
in the contents and categorization (classes/labels) of the training images. The
adversary might also want to misuse the models to distinguish or identify the
domain of the training data with class-membership attacks.
3 Image Disguising for Deep Learning
Our goal is to design a method to protect outsourced image-based deep learn-
ing from the two types of attacks described earlier. The current work will only
address the challenges with whole-image based classification tasks.
Figure 4 depicts the Disguised-Nets framework. A data owner disguises her
private images before outsourcing them to the cloud for storage and DNN learn-
ing. She transforms all of her images using one secure transformation key, K,
which is comprised of the transformation types and the involved parameters. It
is computationally difficult to guess the security key K with brute-force and the
transformed images do not leave sufficient information for adversaries to guess K
or launch the visual re-identification attack. She uses the cloud resources to train
the DNN models from the transformed images with acceptable model quality.
Cloud Provider
DNN
Model
GPU Processing
Data Owner
Train
Disguised test images {TK(Xnew)}
Predictions {y’new}
Disguised Images
{TK(Xi),yi}
Fig. 4. Disguised-Nets: Image disguising framework for DNN learning.
Specifically, assume the data owner owns a set of images for training, notated
as pairs {(Xi, yi)}, where Xi is the image pixel matrix and yi the corresponding
label. We formally define the disguising process as follows. Let the disguising
mechanism be a transformation TK , where K is the secret key which depends on
the selected perturbation techniques. By applying image disguising, the training
data is transformed to {(T (Xi), yi)}, which is used to train a DNN, denoted
as a function DT , that takes disguised images T (X) and outputs a predicted
label yˆ. The models trained on images transformed with the image disguising
mechanisms only work on transformed images and thus cannot be exploited with
other image data as long as the transformation keys are secured. For any new
data Xnew, the model application is defined as DT (T (Xnew)), the new data
transformed with the same key K.
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A remarkable characteristic of Disguised-Nets is that there is no need for one
to alter or tailor the existing DNN architectures to make them compatible with
the privacy mechanisms. One can simply import successful architectures such as
ResNet and VGG to train the desired privacy-preserving models on the trans-
formed data. In our opinion, this simplification is a great advantage over using
traditional encryption or garbled circuit schemes which requires transforming
the target DNN algorithms to their privacy-preserving versions, often a complex
task, which results in expensive and impractical solutions.
The success of this approach depends on the transformation TK that pre-
serves certain properties of the transformed data allowing DNN to learn the
classification task. We consider a suite of image disguising mechanisms that can
be combined with one another to achieve the desired level of privacy and utility.
Candidate mechanisms must hide the visually identifiable features of the images,
i.e., attain good visual privacy and provide a sufficiently large key space to be
resilient to ciphertext-only attacks. As a result, these mechanisms inevitably af-
fect the quality of the learned DNNs. Therefore, finding the settings that provide
both high security and model quality is crucial. While we have not theoretically
justified the utility preserving mechanisms of these transformations yet, the em-
pirical evaluation shows surprisingly good modeling results.
3.1 Image Encoding and Partitioning
An image Xl×m with lm pixels may have three RGB channels or just a single
grayscale channel. We encode grayscale images as matrices of size l ×m whereas
the color images as three channel matrices of size 3× l ×m. The matrices might
be partitioned into smaller blocks for block-wise transformations to improve the
visual privacy. In classification modeling, the image labels ci are mapped to
0, 1, . . . without revealing their mapping to the actual classes.
8 x 8 blocks 2 x 2 blocks8 x 8 blocks 2 x 2 blocks
Tπ(X) 
32 x 32 image
Tπ(X) 
block size 7 x 7 block size 2 x 228 x 28 image
block size 8 x 8 block size 2 x 2 8 x 8 blocks 2 x 2 blocks32 x 32 image
T{RMT, π}(X) 
28 x 28 block28 x 28 image
32 x 32 block 2 x 2 blocks2 x 2 blocks32 x 32 blocks
2 x 2 blocks
T{RMT, π}(X) 
8 x 8 blocks 2 x 2 blocks32 x 32 image
28 x 28 image
T{RMT, π, N}(X) 
T{RMT, π, N}(X) 
2x2 blocks, N=0 2x2 blocks, N=100
2x2 blocks, N=0 2x2 blocks, N=25
(a) Block-wise Permutation. (b) Block-wise RMT. (b) Block-wise RMT+Noise.
Fig. 5. Different disguising mechanisms on MNIST and CIFAR-10 images.
3.2 Block-wise Permutation
The block-wise permutation simply partitions an image and re-arranges the im-
age blocks randomly. An image Xl×m is partitioned into t blocks of uniform
size r × s. If we label the blocks sequentially as v =< 1, 2, 3, 4, ...t >. A pseu-
dorandom permutation of the image, Tpi(X), shuffles the blocks and reassemble
the corresponding image accordingly. The permutation may break the global
patterns of the images and achieve good visual privacy already. However, the
block-wise characteristics such as boundaries, color, content shape, and texture
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of the original neighboring blocks may provide clues for adversaries to recover
the original image - imagine the jigsaw puzzle! Figure 5 (a) shows an example.
For large t, it might be difficult to apply such a jigsaw attack due to the vague
similarity between block boundaries. In practice, however, the image size might
be small, which leads to smaller settings of t insufficient to protect from the
jigsaw attack. Thus, we will need another layer of transformation to address the
jigsaw attack.
3.3 Randomized Multidimensional Transformations (RMT)
To address the block-wise jigsaw attack, we proceed with establishing a more
resilient transformation mechanism that hides the visual attributes that aid in
distinguishing the images from their transformed counterparts. For an image
represented as a pixel matrix X, a general linear transformation can be defined
as G(X) = RX, where Rm×m is a random orthogonal matrix generated following
the Haar distribution [6], or a random projection matrix [17]. When an image is
partitioned into t blocks for random permutation, we will need a list of random
matrices {Ri, i = 1..t}, one for each image-block. The list of matrices {Ri} acts
as a secret key across the dataset and apply to the corresponding image-blocks.
Such transformation is known to preserve (or approximately preserve by ran-
dom projection) the Euclidean distance between columns of the matrix X. For
non-image datasets, it is not possible to recover the original data from the per-
turbed data without certain prior knowledge of the data [10], due to the large pa-
rameter space (we will discuss in Section 4). However, for images, we found that
without block-wise application, i.e., with one RMT for the entire image, RMT
leaks information about sparse contents in images such as in MNIST dataset,
as the zero-valued columns do not change after the transformation as shown
in Figure 5 (b). Thus, it is often beneficial to combine block-wise permutation
and RMT. Interestingly, when combining permutation and RMT, smaller block
sizes preserve better model quality, while the block size may not matter much
in protecting from visual re-identification attack, as shown by our experiments.
To tackle the challenges presented by sparse images, we can also add noises
into the transformation as (X + ∆)R, where ∆ is a random noise matrix, re-
generated for each image (or image block) X, and drawn uniformly at random
from [0, N ] where N is the tunable noise level. Incorporation of additive noise
before applying rotation perturbation converts the zero-pixel areas to noisy non-
zero areas. Figure 5 (c) shows the effects of RMT on MNIST and CIFAR-10
datasets with and without the additional ∆ noise. Note that the dense images,
or even some sparse images, may have been well protected by block-wise permu-
tation and RMT, and thus noise addition may not be needed as we will show in
our experiments later.
4 Security Analysis
In this section, we first present a proposition around the mathematical irre-
versibility of the proposed disguising mechanism under the assumption of ciphertext-
only attacks. Next, we design the methods for the empirical assessment of the
visual re-identification and class-membership attacks.
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4.1 Theoretical Analysis of Parameter Space Complexity
With X ′ = (X + ∆)R, we consider the ciphertext-only attacks scenario, i.e.,
the adversary has accesses to the ciphertexts, X ′, without knowing any map-
ping pairs X → X ′. We present a proposition to show that enumerating the
RMT matrices R is computationally intractable. Assuming the ∆ noise levels
are relatively small and attackers can ignore it, a brute-force attack needs to
enumerate all possible R matrices to identify a valid one (e.g., by applying the
visual re-identification attack). However, we show that the number of possible
R can be exponentially large for given parameters.
Proposition 1 For values encoded in h-bit finite field, there are O(2hm) candi-
date orthogonal matrices Rm×m.
Proof. With h-bit encoding, there are p = 2h distinct values. The theory of
orthogonal matrix group on finite fields states that there are O(pm) orthogonal
matrices in Zm×mp for a p-element field [3]. Hence, there are O(2hm) orthogonal
matrices.
With the current setting we used in the experiments, e.g., h = 32 and m =
4, enumerating the orthogonal matrices R is computationally intractable. For
random projection, as each element of the matrix is randomly drawn from a
normal distribution, the number of possible matrices is even larger.
We can extend the analysis to the case that block-wise RMT and permuta-
tion are combined. For simplicity, let each dimension of the matrix is partitioned
into r shares. Thus, there are r2 matrix blocks, each of which has the size of
(m/r)× (m/r). For one permutation of the blocks, there are O(2hmr) combina-
tions of matrices. Correspondingly, there are O((r2)!2hmr) combinations for all
possible permutations. Therefore, block-wise partitioning further increases the
complexity of the parameter space.
In summary, the parameter space of the image disguising methods is large
enough to address the brute-force ciphertext-only attack.
4.2 Empirical Assessments of Visual Re-identification and
Class-membership Attacks
We design a set of tools for empirically assessing the effect of both the visual
re-identification and class-membership attacks. For the visual re-identification
attacks, we train a DNN examiner with the original training data and apply it
to distinguish the disguised images from one another. We measure the overall
accuracy of these applications. The result (1 - accuracy of DNN examiner) is
used for empirical visual privacy.
For the class-membership attacks, attackers will apply the DNN models
learned from the disguised data to original image data, possibly from other do-
mains or the same domain. Note, without the secret keys, the adversary cannot
transform the attack images. We mimic this attack by applying the disguised
DNN to both in-training and out-training classes of images in their original form.
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We measure the class-wise Fano factors for both the in-training and out-training
classes of images and see if the classes of the images are statistically distin-
guishable. Specifically, for a series of images {Xi, i = 1..n}, the output label
distribution over the classes forms a histogram. Let ncj be the number of labels
for cj , j = 1..k. The estimated mean of the distribution is µ = (
∑k
j=1 ncj )/k and
the estimated variance σ2 is (
∑k
j=1(ncj − µ)2)/k. The Fano factor is σ2/µ. We
expect all in-training classes to have significantly higher Fano factor values than
the out-training classes. In Section 5, we will empirically analyze the resilience
of our image disguising mechanisms against both attacks.
5 Experiments
This experimental evaluation1 has two specific goals. First, we will show that
how effective the image disguising methods in preserving the model quality,
with different parameter settings. Second, we show whether our methods are
also resilient to the two attacks, with the empirical attack evaluation methods
described in Section 4.
Datasets. We test our disguising mechanisms with three prevalent DNN
benchmarking datasets: MNIST and CIFAR-10 and a subset of face recognition
dataset LFW faces. We use an additional dataset known as FASHION dataset in
the class-membership attack evaluations on models trained with MNIST. MNIST
(handwritten digits) and FASHION (fashion items) image-sets both consists of
60,000 training and 10,000 testing gray-scale 28×28 pixel-images with 10 classes.
CIFAR-10 image-set consists of 50,000 training and 10,000 testing color-images
of size 32 × 32 belonging to 10 classes. The subset of LFW faces dataset we
use consists of a relatively smaller number (1,400 training and 150 testing) of
color-images belonging to 12 classes. As LFW has images of a size larger than
the images in CIFAR-10, we resize down the LFW images to 32x32 for assessing
the class-membership attack.
5.1 Model Quality and Setup Cost
Table 1 details the mechanisms, block size, and additive noise level used for
the datasets. We used a simple DNN architecture for MNIST implemented with
TensorFlow, and the more powerful ResNet [7] architecture implemented on
PyTorch for CIFAR-10 and LFW datasets. For MNIST, we set the learning rate
to 0.001 and train the network for 1,000 iterations. For CIFAR-10 and LFW, we
adaptably adjust the learning rate from 0.1 to 0.001 as the models are trained for
350 iterations. We use an 8-GPU cluster to train the models and each experiment
was carried out 5 times to capture the variances of results. Table 2 shows that
the models trained on disguised images perform closely to the optimum models
trained on the undisguised images.
The cost of the image disguising transformations are generally very cheap,
(per image cost is less than 10ms) and can be comfortably done by any PC.
1 Source code and scripts uploaded to https://github.com/datascale/DisguisedNets
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Table 1. Parameter settings and CNN Architectures.
Datasets Mechanisms Block size Noise Level Architecture
MNIST block-wise RMT + Permutation {7× 7} 100 Simple
CIFAR-10 block-wise RMT {2× 2} 25 ResNet
LFW block-wise RMT {2× 2} 50 ResNet
Table 2. Results of applying image disguising mechanisms.
Model Accuracy
Datasets With Disguise Without Disguise
MNIST 96.6 +/- 0.4% 96.7 +/-0.2%
CIFAR-10 89.3%+/-0.1% 93.4 +/-0.2%
LFW 90.6 +/- 1.3% 94.3 +/-2.0
For the experiments in following subsections, we keep all the parameters
in Table 1 constant and vary the parameter under discussion unless noted
otherwise.
5.2 Effect of Parameter Settings on Model Quality
Our objective here is to understand the effect of different parameter settings
on model quality. From Figure 6 (left), it is clear that the DNN models were
significantly more effective when applying RMT with the orthogonal matrices
as compared to applying RMT with projection matrices for MNIST. However,
we observe the variation results in comparable model quality for CIFAR-10 and
LFW. On the other hand, permutation of RMT blocks, which intuitively reduces
the model quality, deteriorates the model quality negligibly for MNIST, moder-
ately for LFW, and a bit alarmingly for CIFAR-10 as seen in Figure 6 (right).
We prefer orthogonal matrices for the optimum setting.
Figure 7 (left) shows that the model quality for LFW and CIFAR-10 datasets
increases with smaller block sizes i.e. with the increasing number of blocks.
However, we do not observe much effect on MNIST. Intuitively, larger noise
levels should degrade model quality. Figure 7 (right) shows the expected effect
is prominent for the CIFAR-10 and LFW with significant degradation of model
quality with increasing noise levels. Again, the effect is absent on the MNIST
dataset, the model quality remaining steady with an increase in noise level.
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Fig. 6. Effect on Model Quality: Orthogonal vs. Projection (left). Permutation (right)
5.3 Attack Evaluation
Resilience to Visual Re-identification Attacks. We observe that both the
orthogonal and projection matrix based RMT successfully thwart the visual re-
identification attacks (i.e. preserve high visual privacy) for all datasets as seen in
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Fig. 7. Effect on Model Quality: Varying block counts (left). Varying noise levels (right)
Figure 8 (left). Further permutation of the RMT blocks prominently increases
the visual privacy for the sparse MNIST dataset whereas not so much for the
denser CIFAR-10 and LFW datasets as seen in Figure 8 (right).
Figure 9 (left) shows that the variation of the block sizes or the block counts
does not affect visual privacy much for the denser datasets of CIFAR-10 and
LFW. However, we observe a detectable drop in visual privacy for MNIST when
using a single RMT for the entire image. On the other hand, the introduction
of the additive noise does not seem to reduce the effectiveness of the DNN-
examiners in compromising visual privacy as seen in Figure 9 (right). As we
observe high visual privacy across the parameter settings mostly, we can be
flexible in choosing the parameters that maximize the model quality. As Figure
7 shows, in general, we can choose smaller block sizes (larger block counts) and
smaller noise levels to achieve better model quality.
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Fig. 8. Effect on Visual Privacy: Orthogonal vs. Projection (left). Permutation (right)
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Resilience to Class-membership Attacks Next, we examine the resilience
of our method to the class-membership attack. Following the empirical method
described in Section 4.2, we measure the class-wise Fano factors for the predic-
tion output probabilities for both the in-training and out-training datasets. We
use different datasets to test how class-membership attacks perform on the DNN
models. Specifically, we partition the datasets by class and then feed the images
in the same class into the model, one class at a time. We then summarize the
output distribution with the Fano factor. Without applying image disguising,
we observe in Figure 10, the Fano factor values for the in-training classes are
clearly distinguishable from those of the out-training classes, with statistically
significant margins (p-value ≤ 0.001). In contrast, for the transformed models,
we observe in Figure 11 the in-training classes and out-training classes are not
distinguishable from each another - a small difference between average values
with p-value > 0.5.
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Fig. 10. Effective class-membership attack on the unprotected models. In-training
class-wise Fano factor is significantly higher.
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Fig. 11. Ineffective class-membership attack on the protected models. In-training class-
wise Fano factor is indistinguishable from that of Out-training.
Discussion. At its current state, Disguised-Nets only considers learning
DNN models that classify images to individual labels. It will be important to
assess if these results carry over to other learning objectives such as multi-label
classification and regression. Furthermore, adapting our disguising mechanism in
transfer learning, which has proven extremely useful in building powerful mod-
els, is a challenging yet interesting task. Lastly, we would like to explore in an
expansion of this work, how closely a malicious adversary can estimate the Ri
matrices in RMT given some leaked pairs of original and disguised images.
6 Related Work
Fan et al. [4] applied a differentially private mechanism to hide certain pixels in
images for image pixelation, however, the obfuscated images are visually identi-
fiable from the global perspective. Li et al. [9] propose learning shallower neural
networks locally by the data owner and sharing the intermediate representation
to the cloud for further learning. Mao et al. [11] propose a similar strategy
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for face detection problem. They let the data owner evaluate the first layer of
the DNN and apply a differentially private noise to the output. However, both
approaches reveal the visually identifiable features of the images.
The most related crypto approach for training DNNs is Mohassel et al. [12]
for SGD-based logistic regression and neural networks. It is based on random-
ized secret sharing, additively homomorphic encryption, and garbled circuits.
However, the framework is very expensive even for small-scale neural networks.
Abadi et al. [2] and Shokri et al. [15] propose training differentially private
DNN models that hides inclusion or exclusion of individual images in the train-
ing data from the model consumers with noisy SGD update algorithms. These
techniques are unsuitable in the outsourced setting for DNN learning as they do
not directly protect the content of the images or the learned models. Similarly,
they present a significant trade-off between model quality.
A set of research focuses on the privacy-preserving evaluation of DNN mod-
els, which is easier to build and less costly than privacy-preserving DNN learning
frameworks. Nathan et al. [18] present the homomorphic encryption based Cryp-
toNets framework for evaluating a DNN with encrypted input data. Similarly,
Rouhani et al. [14] propose a garbled circuit based DNN evaluation protocol.
Our idea of class-membership attack is slightly related to the membership in-
ference addressed by [16], however completely a different concept. Membership
inference attack aims to determine inclusion or exclusion of exact data points
in the training set whereas class-membership attack determines inclusion or ex-
clusion of a certain kind or category of images in the training dataset. Shokri
et al. [13] assess the attack specifically on DNN models. With Disguised-Nets,
this attack becomes irrelevant as it is impossible for an adversary to design and
launch the attack without knowing the exact transformation keys we deploy.
Fredrikson et al. [5] show that it is possible to reverse engineer a machine
learning model to explore the private training data the model was trained with
a model inversion attack (MIA). The success of the MIA attack depends on
unrestrained access to the target machine learning models. With a high level of
visual privacy and the link between the transformed and original images broken
by the RMT parameters, Disguised-Nets need not worry about this attack as
the generated images are also in the transformed space.
7 Conclusion
While using cloud resources for deep learning has been an economical option,
only a few studies address the related privacy concerns. In this paper, we iden-
tify two types of attacks on outsourced deep learning: the visual re-identification
attack and the class-membership attack, which none of the existing candidate so-
lutions can satisfactorily address. We propose our image disguising mechanisms:
Disguised-Nets for privacy-preserving deep learning in the outsourced setting. It
employs a combination of block-wise secret permutation and multidimensional
transformations on each image while preserving a certain utility that the deep
learning algorithms can pick up. Experimental results show that the Disguised-
Nets approach preserves the model quality surprisingly well. It is also resilient
to the visual re-identification and the class-membership attacks.
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